IN December 2003 and January 2004, outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) caused by viruses characterised as haemagglutinin (HA) subtype 5 and neuraminidase subtype 1 (H5N1) were reported almost simultaneously in eight Asian countries -China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Thailand and Vietnam -and they were joined by Malaysia in August 2004. The impact of these viruses was particularly severe in Thailand and Vietnam, where there was widespread disease in poultry and fatal cases of human infection (Tran and others 2004) . In terms of the number of infected flocks and the geographical spread of the disease, this was, and still is, the most serious epidemic of HPAI ever experienced in the virological era. It is also remarkable for affecting not only poultry but also a wide range of wild bird species and mammals including people and cats, both domestic cats and wild animals kept in zoological gardens. The simultaneous reporting of outbreaks over such a large area suggested that a new virus might have emerged and spread rapidly, conceivably presaging a global panzootic. The threat posed by these viruses to public health and to the livelihood of farmers and village communities led to a concerted effort by authorities in the infected countries and by international agencies to control and, where possible, eliminate the infection. Three agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) collaborated to help affected countries to limit the impact of the disease on livelihoods and to safeguard human health. One of their main objectives was to improve the understanding of the origin and evolution of the viruses, factors which are critical for the design and implementation of effective methods for preventing and controlling them. This paper discusses key information about the epidemic, and shows that strong support by the international community continues to be required to help infected countries control the disease, to protect human health and to prevent the viruses from spreading to other regions of the world.
HISTORY OF H5N1 VIRUSES IN ASIA

Emergence of H5N1 viruses in Asia and disease in Hong Kong in 1997
The emergence of H5N1 viruses in Asia since 1996 was a key determinant of the 2004 epidemic. The mutation and spread of the viruses between 1999 and 2002 set the stage for the apparently simultaneous 'emergence' of acute disease in many countries.
Highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses have been recognised in Asia since 1996 (Xu and others 1999) when the first Asian H5N1 virus (Goose/GD/96) was isolated from sick geese in southern China. However, before the recent epidemic they had been associated only with cases of subclinical infection and inter-
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Veterinary Record (2005) 157, [159] [160] [161] [162] [163] [164] mittent localised outbreaks of disease. Molecular analysis shows that the 1996 virus lies at, or near, the head of an Asian H5N1 lineage comprising several distinct genotypes that have emerged and, in many cases, disappeared during the subsequent eight years (Guan and others 2002 , Chen and others 2004 , Li and others 2004 . These viruses have evolved both by mutations in individual genes and by gene reassortment.
The origins of Goose/GD/96 are not known, but presumably, like all avian influenza viruses, it came from an unidentified precursor virus of low pathogenicity circulating in wild aquatic birds (Alexander 2000) . It is not surprising that no ancestral virus has been identified, given the minimal surveillance of wild birds in Asia at that time. All H5N1 viruses isolated since 1996, regardless of their source, belong to this lineage and meet the OIE definition of highly pathogenic viruses (Cauthen and others 2000, Guan and others 2002 , Alexander 2004 , Chen and others 2004 , Li and others 2004 . In this respect the outbreak differs fundamentally from the outbreaks of HPAI reported in domestic poultry elsewhere in the world, in which introductions of low pathogenicity viruses from wild birds have converted to highly pathogenic strains. In Asia, highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses have been circulating since 1996.
The first reported cases of serious disease associated with H5N1 virus in Asia involved fatal disease in poultry and people in Hong Kong in 1997 others 1998, Sims and others 2003) . The causal H5N1 virus was a reassortant with an HA gene derived from a Goose/GD/96-like virus, and its seven other genes from different (non-H5) avian influenza viruses (Webster and others 2002) . This particular genotype has not been recorded since it was eliminated late in 1997 following the culling of all poultry in markets and all chickens on farms (Sims and others 2003) . The H5N1 viruses isolated in Hong Kong during 1997 showed differences involving all their genes, with 97·9 to 100 per cent homology across the eight gene segments (Zhou and others 1999) , confirming the mutability and rapid rate of evolution of these viruses, a finding that has been reinforced in later years. H5N1 viruses closely related to the original goose genotype continued to circulate in geese in southern China in the late 1990s (Cauthen and others 2000) , and by 2000/01, several genotypes had been detected in domestic ducks and geese others 2002, Chen and others 2004) . Molecular studies suggest that these reassortant viruses acquired new internal genes in various combinations from unidentified avian influenza viruses circulating in aquatic birds (Guan and others 2002) .
H5N1 infection in domestic waterfowl
The expansion of the host range of H5N1 viruses from geese to ducks was probably a key event in the genesis of the epidemic in 2004. Recent epidemiological studies strongly suggest that domestic ducks played a key role in the spread of these viruses to terrestrial poultry (M. Gilbert, personal communication).
Since 2002, H5N1 viruses have continued to be found in waterfowl in the region (Li and others 2004) with some, but not all, being associated with disease in domestic ducks and wild birds. The reasons for this variation in pathogenicity are poorly understood and are the subject of research others 2004, Sturm-Ramirez and others 2004) . Surveillance of live bird markets in southern China in early 2004 revealed high infection rates in clinically normal domestic ducks, with approximately 25 per cent of samples yielding H5N1 viruses (Li and others 2004) . A recent study showed that experimentally infected clinically normal mallard ducks can excrete the virus asymptomatically for 17 days (Anon 2004), a finding which reinforces the hypothesis that infection in domestic ducks may cause high levels of environmental contamination and be a significant source of infection for chickens and other birds.
It is therefore likely that high levels of infection in clinically normal domestic ducks were an important factor that contributed to the epidemic, owing to the widespread 'seeding' of the virus in countries such as Thailand and Vietnam, and southern China, where ducks are commonly present on farms and range freely on ponds and rice paddies.
H5N1 viruses in terrestrial poultry after 1997
After 1997 the first reported cases of infection with H5N1 viruses and disease in terrestrial poultry occurred in 2001 (Sims and others 2003) . Seven distinct H5N1 genotypes (one Goose/GD/96-like and the rest reassortant viruses) were identified in terrestrial poultry in the Hong Kong SAR and Guangdong province of China in that year and another five genotypes were identified in terrestrial poultry in 2002 others 2002, Sims and other 2003) ; one of the latter has since become dominant, the so-called 'Z' genotype (Li and others 2004) , although other genotypes continue to circulate (Mase and others 2005) .
The first known representative of the 'Z' genotype virus was apparently isolated from a healthy duck in Guangxi province, China, in 2001 (Chen and others 2004) . These viruses, referred to by Chen and colleagues as the 'G' genotype, have continued to evolve, through the mutation of individual genes rather than reassortment, so that 'Z' genotype viruses isolated from the same location at different times, or from different countries at the same time may have significant molecular and antigenic differences on the basis of their gene sequences and antibody profiles others 2004, Li and others 2004) .
TRADE AND THE SPREAD OF HPAI
Both the legal and illegal trade in poultry and poultry products could have contributed to the spread of H5N1 viruses. There are long land borders between many of the infected countries in the region and it is acknowledged that there are unofficial movements of poultry and poultry products across them. The movement of live poultry, including fighting cocks, across borders and within countries has apparently been an important route for the spread of the viruses. Investigations of outbreaks of disease suggested that smuggling of fighting cocks was the most likely route of entry of the virus into Malaysia. On at least three occasions H5N1-infected birds have been intercepted at border entry points, including doves in Malaysia (Anon 2005), eagles in Belgium and ducks in Taiwan Province of China others 2004, Suetens and others 2004) demonstrating that illegal trade in birds could have contributed to the spread of infection.
It was proposed that the integrated multinational poultry operations supplying birds and vaccines might have inadvertently spread H5N1 viruses within the region, largely on the basis that they were located in infected countries and the disease was present in some of their flocks. No supporting evident for this proposal has been identified.
H5N1 viruses were detected in legally imported duck meat in South Korea (Tumpey and others 2002) and Japan (Anon 2003) . As the infection can result in the spread of virus to the brain and muscle in clinically normal birds, this finding is not unexpected (Tumpey and others 2002) . Trade in infected meat could contribute to the spread of infection, if uncooked meat scraps were fed to poultry. However, although it cannot be ruled out, transmission by this means might not be significant as avian influenza viruses are killed in the process of cooking to a temperature of 70°C. The potential for transmission in this way would be higher in villages where the trimmings from meat may be fed to free-range poultry with discarded vegetable material.
One 2001 isolate of H5N1 virus from duck meat imported into the Republic of Korea was very similar genetically to viruses found in ducks in and around Shanghai, the source of the meat (Chen and others 2004) . However, the H5N1 viruses associated with outbreaks of disease in importing countries in 2003/04 were not genetically homologous with those isolated so far from domestic ducks in China (the exporting country) or with the viruses detected in imported duck meat. (Mase and others 2005) . This suggests that even though the viruses may have been introduced via trade in poultry products, they did not necessarily lead to infection on farms.
Trade in songbirds in Asia has also been proposed as a potential source of infection (Melville and Shortridge 2004) but there is no virological or epidemiological evidence to support the proposal. Live bird markets are recognised as important places for the maintenance and exchange of avian influenza viruses (Kung and others 2003) , including the H5N1 viruses found regularly in markets in the region. However, the detection of H5N1 viruses was only occasionally associated with detectable signs of disease or increases in mortality others 2003, Li and others 2004) . Many species of birds, both wild and domestic, are kept at markets in many parts of Asia and this practice can facilitate the exchange and spread of viruses between them. Contaminated equipment and infected birds moved between markets and farms constitute a major disease risk.
WILD BIRDS AND THE SPREAD OF AVIAN INFLUENZA
On the basis of epidemiological observations in several countries, wild birds may have played a role in the spread of H5N1 viruses. In Japan, infected chicken farms derived their water from sources that were not protected from wild birds and this was considered to be a potential source of infection (MAFF Japan 2004) .
Although a potential role for migratory birds in the spread of infection is supported by the isolation of H5N1 viruses from sick or dead migratory birds in places where poultry were at the time free from infection, for example grey herons in the Hong Kong SAR, the timing of the migrations does not match the timing of the initial disease reports in 2003/04 (Melville and Shortridge 2004) . Taken alone, this evidence does not rule out these birds as a potential source of infection, because the reports do not always indicate the date of the initial viral incursion. Virus could spread from wild birds to domestic waterfowl, in which it could multiply without signs of disease, before terrestrial poultry became infected, resulting in a lag between the movements of migratory birds and disease being detected.
Isolates of H5N1 viruses from wild birds are usually associated with signs of disease or the death of the host. In a number of cases, such as crows in Japan (Mase and others 2004) , the wild birds were believed to have been infected by diseased poultry or infected captive birds (Ellis and others 2004) rather than having been the source of the virus for poultry. Molecular studies have not provided conclusive evidence that the H5N1 viruses in terrestrial poultry in Asia have originated directly from wild birds. However, the areas in which wild birds and domestic waterfowl share the same environment are sufficiently extensive in many parts of Asia for there to be a significant opportunity for the exchange of viruses to occur, especially where ducks are free-ranging or raised on ponds. Experimentally infected, clinically normal mallards excreted virus for at least 17 days, demonstrating their potential to act as vectors (Anon 2004) .
Although there is some circumstantial evidence for the transmission of the viruses by wild birds, there is little reason to believe that they have played a more significant role in spreading disease than the trade through live bird markets and the movement of domestic waterfowl.
ANALYSING PATTERNS OF DISEASE AND SELECTED RISK FACTORS
Regional effects
The reported patterns of disease differ considerably among the nine infected countries, but given the similar profiles of infectivity and pathogenicity in chickens of the viruses isolated after 2000, it is likely that the properties of the viruses played only a limited role in these observed regional differences. They are more likely to have been due to differences between the systems of poultry production in each country, the extent of the infection when disease was first reported and the population density of poultry in the affected areas.
There are significant differences in the structure of the poultry industry both between and within countries. For example, in southern China 'yellow' meat chickens are produced, a high percentage of poultry is sold through live bird markets, and most of the country's ducks are also produced there, whereas further north commercial broiler and layer production predominate. This may be a factor in the concentration of disease outbreaks in southern Chinese provinces. In contrast, in Japan there are virtually no live bird markets and no commercial duck production, differences which may explain why the disease has failed to spread.
With only a few exceptions, for example, in outbreaks in Japan and China, additional cases of disease have been reported within an approximately 10 km radius of the index case, demonstrating that the basic reproductive rate of the virus ('R 0 ' value) was greater than 1 and that local spread normally occurred, in agreement with findings elsewhere (Stegeman and others 2004) .
The epidemic in China had unique characteristics that might in part have been due to the disease control measures introduced. China gave the highest priority to the rapid destruction of poultry in a 3 km zone and the vaccination of poultry in a further 5 km zone around cases of disease (information reported to the OIE on February 13, 2004 [OIE 2004 ). This strategy would have halted the progression of any locally transmitted viruses and prevented them from being detected.
Other factors affecting the 'visibility' of the disease could also have influenced the perception of disease patterns in the region. These include the quality of disease reporting and of the surveillance systems, and the effect of specific control measures introduced in infected places, including the use of vaccination. There are anecdotal reports of the unsanctioned use of vaccine in the region before 2004 and this might have modified the patterns of disease in some places.
Effects relating to the structure of production sectors
Reports analysed by the FAO suggest that small commercial farms and the flocks of smallholders/villagers are more susceptible to infection than larger commercial farms. More outbreaks occur in these smallholdings even though, in most of the infected countries, more poultry are raised in large farms. In Thailand, for example, a study of confirmed cases of infection between July and September 2004 found that 64 per cent of the infected farms/premises or holdings contained 1000 or fewer poultry.
Within the affected countries, the disease appears to have spared many areas with a high population density of poultry, possibly as a result of the better biosecurity and management practices of the large commercial farms. Alternatively, it is possible that some large commercial farms initiated their own control programmes without reporting the outbreak to official veterinary services.
Seasonal effects
The peak of the Asian H5N1 epidemic occurred in winter 2003/04. Earlier surveillance studies of markets in China, including the Hong Kong SAR, showed that H5N1 viruses were isolated more frequently during the winter months (Li and others 2004) , possibly as a result of the better survival of the virus in low temperatures, combined with the increased movement and trade in poultry associated with winter festivals. However, outbreaks of disease have occurred in Asia in all seasons. The first outbreaks of H5N1 in chicken farms in Hong Kong were reported in March, April and May 1997 (Sims and others 2003) . The first post-1997 outbreak of avian influenza in live bird markets in the Hong Kong SAR occurred in May 2001, although H5N1 virus had first been detected in a market in February of that year (Sims and others 2003) . Low temperatures do not appear to have been a major factor in the occurrence of disease in Thailand where cases have been detected throughout the year. The conditions that facilitate the spread and survival of the viruses make winter a high-risk period for their transmission, but cases can occur at other times of the year.
Observations on disease patterns
The countries that have reported outbreaks of HPAI in 2003/04 can be divided into four categories: countries with a low mean population density of poultry and a limited commercial poultry industry (Lao PDR and Cambodia); countries with welldeveloped commercial poultry industries that rapidly eliminated limited incursions (Republic of Korea, Japan and Malaysia); countries where the infection was widespread and vaccination was not implemented (Thailand and Vietnam); and countries where the infection was widespread and vaccination was implemented (China and Indonesia).
Lao PDR and Cambodia Most of the poultry in these countries are kept by smallholders or in villages. The countries have a low mean population density of poultry (<100/km 2 ), in association with the comparatively low human population density. There are some areas with higher populations of people and poultry, particularly around major cities and, in Cambodia, in an area near the south-east border with Vietnam, where cases of infection in people have recently been detected.
Before the outbreaks in 2004, the surveillance systems in these countries were largely passive and there was limited capacity for diagnosis. It is possible that some cases of H5N1 may not have been recognised, especially in village poultry, where the infection is not necessarily characterised by heavy and widespread mortality.
The report of a single case of disease in Cambodia in September 2004 and human cases in early 2005 indicated that there were some remaining pockets of infection. The human cases were probably associated with the widespread occurrence of virus in the area around the lower Mekong River at the time. The low population density of poultry in large parts of these countries should minimise the risk of widespread disease outbreaks if the virus reappears.
Republic of Korea, Japan and Malaysia Nineteen infected farms were detected in the Republic of Korea, including a number of duck farms that were detected by targeted surveillance, usually in the absence of clinical disease. Veterinary authorities in the Republic of Korea consider that domestic ducks were probably infected with H5N1 virus several months before the infection of chickens, possibly via wild birds.
Four farms and a processing plant were found to be infected in Japan in the southern part of Honshu and one prefecture in the north of Kyushu. The outbreaks appear not to have been related and only one secondary case was identified, on a farm in Kobe prefecture. Investigations suggested that the most likely source of virus was water from unscreened and untreated ponds used for poultry, indicating a possible role for wild birds in the introduction of the virus. Isolates obtained in 2003/04 from farms in Japan and the Republic of Korea were very closely related (more than 99 per cent homology for all genes), suggesting a common origin (Mase and others 2005) . Despite the similarity of the isolates to a virus (the 'V' genotype) isolated from a chicken in Guangdong province (Mase and others 2005) , an identical precursor virus has not been detected in domestic poultry or wild birds elsewhere in the region.
Malaysia escaped avian influenza until August 2004, when the first case was identified in a village about 20 km from the Thai border, an area with only village and smallholder poultry kept at a low population density. In total, between August 17 and September 22, 2004, 12 cases of infection were detected, including 11 where disease was present. One outlier, in which no disease was found, was reported on November 19. The average flock mortality rate was 5·3 per cent, and ranged from 0 to 42 per cent of the susceptible population. Field evidence suggests that the illegal entry of a fighting cock was the most likely route of infection. The outbreak in Malaysia was detected quickly and it was eliminated by the rapid, effective response of the official veterinary services. (Nguyen and others 2005) . The lack of surveillance data on domestic waterfowl makes it difficult to understand the subsequent evolution of these viruses. In late 2004 and early 2005, Vietnam continued to report outbreaks of disease in poultry in many parts of the country and fatal human cases of infection. The most likely reason for this apparent increase in incidence is the presence of infected flocks of domestic waterfowl that had not previously been detected.
In Thailand, an intensive ('x-ray') survey detected more than 750 infected flocks in 51 provinces between October 1 and December 9, 2004. This large number was probably due as much to the introduction of intensive surveillance as to large numbers of disease outbreaks. An unusual aspect of the disease in Thailand was the report of fatal cases in domestic and wild cats believed to be due to ingestion of H5N1 viruses in their feed (Kuiken and others 2004) .
China and Indonesia All but one of the 50 reported outbreaks of disease in terrestrial poultry in China occurred during a four-week period in January to February 2004. These cases were widely dispersed over an area extending from Guangdong province in the south to Jilin province in the north, and from Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in the west to Shanghai in the east. Most of the cases occurred in the south east of the country. The pattern of disease differed markedly from that observed in other countries and places.
The analysis of the H5N1 viruses isolated in China since 1999, including those from the Hong Kong SAR, shows that there were multiple genotypes that can be grouped into sev-eral sublineages. There is considerable variation in the HA genes of the viruses isolated in different parts of China, during and before 2004 others 2004, Li and others 2004) . However, some of the viruses isolated contemporaneously from individual provinces or special administrative regions were closely related, possibly suggesting a common origin. These findings suggest the presence in the region of a pool of H5N1 viruses that have continued to evolve over several years.
Infection was present in Indonesia in 2003, became widespread in 2004 and persisted into 2005, with cases in provinces previously considered to be free from infection. Only limited genetic information is available; those that have been sequenced belong to the 'Z' genotype and are most similar to the H5N1 viruses found in China and Hong Kong (Li and others 2004) . The route of entry into the country remains unknown. Widespread use of vaccine has reduced the impact of the disease but outbreaks continue to occur, possibly owing to the existence of a reservoir of viruses and the difficulties in mounting an effective vaccination programme.
TIMING OF THE EPIDEMIC
The activity of H5N1 viruses appeared to peak in December 2003 and January 2004 with nearly simultaneous reports of HPAI from eight Asian countries -South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, China, Thailand, Lao PDR and Cambodia. However, for the majority of these countries, the first case of infection with H5N1 virus preceded the first report of disease to international veterinary authorities (the OIE), in some of them by several years.
Conditions favouring the spread of H5N1 viruses were present much earlier but widespread outbreaks were not reported. By 2001, H5N1 viruses had been identified in Vietnam (Nguyen and others 2001) and coastal provinces in China, extending from Guangxi to Shanghai (Chen and others 2004) . Live bird markets in the Hong Kong SAR were the only places where disease associated with H5N1 viruses was reported in 2001 (Sims and others 2003) . The apparent absence of disease elsewhere was remarkable given that the production and marketing systems in the infected areas would have exposed terrestrial poultry to highly pathogenic viruses from subclinically infected domestic ducks. The failure to recognise, diagnose or report disease/infection may have been a factor. In addition, in some places the use of unsanctioned vaccination might have changed the nature and behaviour of the disease.
The most likely reason for the emergence of disease in 2003 is that the virus spread from well established reservoirs of infection in domestic waterfowl and live bird markets in large parts of the region, combined with the increased excretion of the virus by infected waterfowl, perhaps as a result of a change in the H5N1 virus. With support from the FAO, OIE and WHO, most countries in the region increased surveillance for the disease during spring 2004 and this resulted in more cases being detected. The virus probably spread by several routes, including the trade in poultry within and between countries and possibly by the movement of wild birds. It is tempting to blame wild birds for much of the spread of H5N1 viruses. However, the movement of infected poultry or contaminated equipment and people associated with the poultry industry are likely to have been more important, especially given the presence (often undetected) of these viruses in live bird markets and clinically normal domestic waterfowl. In some countries, the dissemination of virus from these sites is facilitated by marketing and husbandry practices that result in the mixing of different species of poultry on farms and in live bird markets, and by the recirculation of contaminated cages and equipment between markets and farms. Experience in other countries has shown that avian influenza viruses spread readily via the movement of infected birds and contaminated equipment (Alexander 2000) .
THE FUTURE
In the past 12 months the impact of H5N1 in Asia has been greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the infection remains widespread in some countries, as shown by the continuing detection of infection and disease in poultry and people during late 2004 and early 2005. The virus has also been detected in several species of wild birds. If control measures and surveillance are relaxed, there is a real risk of a resurgence of disease and the incursion of the virus into countries previously free of it.
For countries in which the infection has become widespread and entrenched, it is unlikely that the official veterinary services will be able to eradicate it from major areas/populations in the short to medium term. In the short term it is important to manage the risks to human health and prevent the disease from spreading. Improved biosecurity, the stamping-out of known infection, vaccination and the implementation of basic public health measures can be used to achieve these objectives. In practice, the combined application of all these measures as appropriate to the local conditions will give the greatest likelihood of success. It is imperative to implement active surveillance systems, based on the FAO's guiding principles for diagnosis and surveillance of HPAI (FAO 2004) , to detect the infection early and to manage the disease effectively.
In the longer term, enzootically infected countries should try to contain the virus within specific geographical zones or production sectors by developing, maintaining and gradually enlarging disease-free regions. The elimination of H5N1 viruses from domestic poultry in these countries will require the smallholder/village sectors to be restructured, significantly affecting the countries' economic and social fabric. The trading of poultry and other avian species in live bird markets will need to be strictly controlled, and contacts between chickens and waterbirds, farmed and wild, will need to be restricted.
As part of the control measures, tactical, targeted vaccination campaigns can play a useful role in reducing the impact of avian influenza. In sectors where the risk of disease is high and biosecurity cannot be relied upon to prevent reinfection, vaccination may be required on a long-term basis to prevent poultry and people from being infected.
In accordance with the local conditions, the FAO has recommended the controlled use of appropriate vaccines formulated in accordance with OIE guidelines. Countries using vaccines should implement monitoring systems to assess the effectiveness of their vaccination campaigns and to detect the emergence of any antigenic variants. The composition of the vaccine should be assessed regularly against the currently circulating strains of virus to ensure a reasonable antigenic match. There has been no internationally validated study to determine whether the vaccines are effective in domestic waterfowl, a question that needs to be investigated urgently.
H5N1 viruses will continue to circulate in Asia and mutate, and the emergence of new reassortant H5N1 viruses cannot be ruled out. However, the implementation of effective control measures, which is well under way in Asia, coupled with enhanced programmes for the surveillance and diagnosis of infection, will help to reduce the risks to animal and human health. Uninfected countries in Asia and elsewhere will remain susceptible to the entry of disease from infected areas, and increased vigilance, effective biosecurity and quarantine controls must be maintained to reduce this risk.
Although considerable information was available about the existence of H5N1 viruses in the region by 2003, the sur-veillance, reporting and disease management systems were inadequate to prevent the occurrence of a major epidemic, and in spite of the improvements made in the past year some countries still lack the infrastructure required to implement them effectively. These countries need a sustained commitment of resources to help them achieve these objectives.
The FAO's emergency support has helped countries to improve their surveillance and diagnostic systems with regional networking; it is expected that this will provide additional intelligence and warning of emerging or latent problems so that appropriate action can be taken. A failure to incorporate all the countries in the region into a harmonised strategic approach, including improvements to surveillance, information sharing and reporting, and disease management, will limit the prospects of success.
